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Abstract:  Reber’s Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) has much to recommend it. However, 
while the CBC effectively renders null any ontological gap between mind and body, it leaves two 
important remaining gaps unaddressed: the epistemologic and the causal gap. Brakel’s (2013) 
Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism (DiCoToP) is briefly introduced as a beginning remedy 
for the epistemologic, but unfortunately not the causal, gap. Thus the “hard problem” remains 
both hard and problematic. 
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My basic agreement with Reber’s (2016) target article far outweighs my disagreements. I agree, 
for example, with his taking issue with any form of mind/body dualism, which I assume includes 
property as well as substance dualism. I agree with his biological reductionism based on 
evolutionary principles, allowing that subjectivity, mental goings-on, and (let me add) agency  
(Brakel 2016) — such as choices to move this way or that, and to ingest, avoid or approach — 
are ever-present throughout the living locomoting world. (I also agree that plants are another 
matter, warranting serious attention, but not in his target article, nor my commentary.)  
The one area in which I disagree concerns Reber’s assertion that the so-called “hard 
problem” is actually a category error, one that can be resolved by his Cellular Basis of 
Consciousness (CBC). I concur with Reber that there is no ontological gap between the mental 
and physical (mind and body) for any theorist embracing physicalism. Mental processes, 
including consciousness with qualia, are identical with their underlying brain structures —
neuronal assemblies, neurochemicals, etc. However, I hold that the ontologic gap is not the only 
one. There are two more gaps to bridge. One is epistemological: What knowledge can we bring 
to bear about the relation between the physical (cellular) brain and subjective mental 
outcomes? The second gap is causal and even more vexing: How can these physical processes 
cause the mental ones? Even with no doubt that they are the causes — they must be, given that 
physical stuff is all there is ontologically — it is not a category mistake to ask this “how” 




 Now I am no “New Mysterian” (McGinn 1989). Just as other formerly vexing questions 
can now be answered — e.g., how is it that multiple molecules of H2O cause the emergent fluid 
properties of water, properties that are irrelevant to a single H2O molecule — I believe that this 
causal question too will yield to the scientific answers. But views like Professor Reber’s give up 
too much and give out too soon on the causal and epistemological gaps. Like Galen Strawson 
(1994, 2009), who suggests that experience is an essential (perhaps the essential) aspect of any 
physical matter that we can know,1 Reber’s is a non-reductive physicalist account rather than a 
reductive one. As attractive as these sorts of views are — deeming the hard question as 
unanswerable and thereby a wrong question does have considerable appeal — the 
epistemological and causal gaps are finessed and/or dismissed.    
 With this criticism registered, I hereby admit that my own mind/body reductive 
physicalist account, Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism (DiCoToP) does absolutely no 
better on the causal gap question. (See Brakel 2013, Chapter 3, for a full and lengthy 
development of this view.)  It does begin to address the epistemologic gap, however, proposing 
that a biologically informed token physicalism (rather than the more popular type physicalism) 
can use the normal degeneracy2 of neuronal assemblies along with the capacity for multiple 
“different” physical realizations of the “same” mental processes to begin to understand 
mind/body relations.  
 Again, I have no quarrel with Reber’s (2016) conclusion as far as it goes: “Reactivity, 
consciousness, intentionality, memorial representation, creativity and all the rest are 
manifestations of particular kinds of organic stuff….No new ingredients are needed: simply an 
understanding of how the old ones function and permit the evolution of the newer” (p. 10). 
However, merely understanding that there has been an evolution does not tell the story of how 
it took place. And there is a story. Consider this analogy: There is no new ingredient when 
Superman becomes the physically identical Clark Kent (or vice versa), and yet there is a big and 
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